Social security systems around the globe have become gradually less sustainable
since they were introduced. These systems vary in age and format among countries,
but follow a universal design. They operate on a pay-as-you-go basis (Dotsey),
where the social security contributions of today benefit current retirees.
Critics of such a format suggest that it resembles a Ponzi scheme (Martin),
in which the capital of new investors is used to pay dividends to current
investors. Inevitably the source of new funds declines and the scam reaches
default. Comparably, declining worker-to-retiree ratios have pushed most social
security systems towards insolvency. Social security reform has evolved as
a global trend as a result of this international pension crisis. Two countries
to undergo change include Chile and Britain (Berlau). Both nations implemented
privatized systems, which transfers the burden of retirement planning from
government to individuals. High levels of success in Chile and Britain lends
to the credibility of privatization as the ideal reform. Most individuals
are novice investors and require assistance from the financial services industry
under privatization. As a result, the demand for financial services firms
is booming with the spread of privatization.
Social security insolvency will impact many large countries, including Japan,
Italy, France, Australia, Canada, and the United States (Rubis). This problem
will impinge on developing nations as well. Emerging nations are actually
among the first to address the social security dilemma, as reform is already
spreading in Latin America. Section II of this paper will expand upon the
urgency of this issue and the factors that have caused it to materialize.
Shrinking worker-to-retiree ratios and longer life expectancies, among other
trends, will be used to show the magnitude of the problem. Switching to a
private accounts system is a difficult process to undergo. For example, the
United States anticipates social security to reach default by 2015, when expenditures
will exceed receipts by $57 billion (Bandow). A drawn-out transition period
is the primary reason that the United States and other countries in the same
position must institute reform immediately.
During the 1990's global investors embraced on-line trading as a cost-effective
vehicle for building wealth. This was especially gratifying for U.S. investors
who enjoyed high returns on technology equities. However, a shakeout in the
U.S., economic turmoil in the East, and declines in South America have made
good investments harder to find. They now seek the assistance of full-service
brokerages to help them identify safe and growth-oriented assets. This trend
is evidenced in the rising share values of full-service firms like Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter and declining values of discount brokers such as Charles
Schwab (Khalfani). This pattern is becoming more apparent with the move to
privatized social security systems. The demand for wealth management specialists
is growing, a shift towards safer investments has ensued, and the global financial
services industry is expanding. Section III of this paper will show these
trends in the finance field. A rising number of new applicants recognize the
increasing demand for their services.
Section IV will show that in countries where social security privatization
is undertaken, a boom in the local financial services industry should follow.
This section refers to Chile's privatized system to demonstrate the impact
on the nation and financial services professionals. Chile was the first country
in the Western hemisphere to initiate a social security program in 1924 (MacRae).
Chile was an innovator again in 1981 when the government introduced the first
full-scale privatized system. Privatization took place under authoritarian
leader Augusto Pinochet, who is referred to as "the Stalin of free market
capitalism" ("A Strongman's"). Chile has now returned to democracy,
but enjoys the legacy of Pinochet's reign. Privatization of social security
has led to prosperity, more investment in the economy, and higher savings
levels (Pinera). The latter two are chiefly responsible for the boost in the
Chilean financial services industry.
Germany was among the first large nations to adopt a social security system
in 1889 ("Germany"). In the early 1920's, Japan enacted a series
of welfare programs based on the German model. The U.S. was "the last
of the world's big economies to do so in 1935," (MacRae) incorporating
a social security program in Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. In all
three countries, social security was originally designated to prevent destitution.
However, the scope of social security soon became all-inclusive in each case.
Partly, this has acted as an impetus for current problems. Also, declining
worker-to-retiree ratios burden governments with worries of meeting future
funding gaps. Furthermore, longer life expectancies and larger retired populations
challenge social security. Privatization is largely recognized as the ideal
reform measure, but it lacks the support of many liberals. The liberal ideology
accepts social security as a governmental obligation. However, privatization
is consistent with the conservative philosophy that government should have
a limited role in national welfare. At its core, social security reform is
not a matter of politics, but an issue of pragmatism.
Global social security "retirement benefits were originally meager- and
late" (Carter and Shipman). Carter and Shipman note that 65 was pegged
as the retirement age in the U.S. when the average life expectancy was 61
(Carter and Shipman). Despite longer life expectancies, the qualification
age for social security remains at 65. In addition, the population percentage
above age 65 will at least double in most developed nations by 2020 from where
it was in 1960. This proportion will grow from 5% to 16% in the U.S., 11%
to 21% in Denmark, and 9% to 21% in Italy (Carter and Shipman). Frequent tax
increases are commonly used to sustain social security. However, longer life
expectancies and increasing numbers of beneficiaries outmatches the effectiveness
of progressive taxation.
Declining fertility rates, coupled with the post-World War II baby boom generation
reaching retirement age, will weigh heavily upon social security systems in
the next decade. Only some countries experienced the baby boom phenomenon,
but lower fertility rates are widespread. Population growth rates have already
begun to slow as a result of this trend. One study of annual growth rates
from 1960 to 1990 shows a decline "from .86 percent to .32 percent in
Europe, from 1.63 percent to 1.01 percent in North America, from 2.06 percent
to 1.81 percent in Asia, and from 2.75 percent to 1.87 percent in Latin America"
(Poortvliet and Laine, part I). As a consequence, the workforce shrinks along
with regular contributions to social security.
A comparative look at workforce size and the retirement population generates
a useful worker-to-retiree ratio. This ratio indicates the level of stress
on a social security system. For example, there were 42 workers per retiree
when social security was implemented in the U.S. (Dotsey). This statistic
reached 3.3 workers for each retiree in 1997 and is projected to be 2.2 workers
by 2030 (Triest). Many other nations will be impacted to a similar degree.
There is alarming consensus in the Generation X cohort that social security
will not be around when they retire (Martin). How many people will be affected
by worldwide social security default? The World Bank estimates that by 2030,
"16% of the world's population will be age 60 or older-well over 1 billion
people-the majority of whom will average 25 years or more in retirement"
(Carter and Shipman). This staggering figure demands for the immediate overhaul
of global social security systems.
Privatization provides individuals with more retirement income, especially
if they invest aggressively. Privatizing, or personalizing social security,
"would allow each and every individual to take personal control of his
or her own financial destiny" (Martin). Specifically, this enables workers
to invest part of their pension plan monies in private markets and alternative
vehicles. This allows much higher returns than government controlled systems.
For example, the U.S. stock market continues its 7% historical rate of return,
which is superior to the 3.9% yield from social security (Goldstein). Individuals
can include stocks, bonds, CD's, and other instruments, depending on their
risk tolerance. Privatization funnels money into capital markets, especially
in developing countries. It promotes capital formation, which accordingly
enhances national productivity. Poortvliet and Laine note that industrialized
nations will gain too; for example, one goal of Italy's retirement savings
initiative is to bolster the country's underdeveloped stock market (Poortvliet
and Laine, part I). Naturally, such reform is contradictory to certain political
ideals and has received moderate criticism.
Liberal fundamentalists believe that "government-sponsored retirement
schemes are an inherent political right" (MacRae). They feel the disparity
of investing experience among individuals leads to inequality under privatization.
Skill levels will range from inexperienced to highly seasoned in a society,
affording knowledgeable investors the most opportunity. If privatization came
to fruition in the U.S., liberals would support caps on the earning potential
of the most savvy and experienced investors. This is consistent with the liberal
proposal in the U.S. to initiate a government fund-matching program, where
the lowest income brackets receive the highest benefits ("A Safer"
A24). Liberals question the viability of privatization reform now underway
in Peru because half of the population are low-wage-earners in the "informal
sector" (Poortvliet and Laine, part II). Liberal advocates feel the Peruvian
government should provide a minimum benefit to individuals. This counters
the purpose of reform, unless government benefits were to dissipate as the
economy develops. In the U.S. and Peru, a system with government participation
guarantees future tax hikes, especially considering demographic trends. Liberals
support this fiscal policy of progressive taxation as a means for sustaining
national welfare benefits.
Social security reform is more an issue of economic feasibility and secondarily
a political debate. Nonetheless, a system of personal accounts harnesses the
capitalist spirit, which is an inherent attribute of conservative mentality.
Privatization requires government funding for the transition phase so that
current social security recipients continue receiving benefits. In the long
run, these taxes disappear. Conservatives favor privatization because it increases
investment in the private sector significantly and drives the economy. Also,
conservatives identify various forms of welfare today as charity, not a right.
Again, social security reform has become a political debate, but must be examined
in an economic arena. One economist said, "Virtually every firm in America
would benefit from a higher rate of return on capital, increased capital stock,
and larger national income" (Bandow). Britain's experiment with partial
privatization in 1978 showed its viability. The government allowed "qualified
workers" to opt out of "public retirement schemes" and create
private plans (MacRae). In just three years, half of those "qualified
workers" established private accounts and discovered the benefits of
privatization. It promotes greater investment in the economy, which facilitates
growth and improved national welfare.
Privatization of social security generates increased demand for global financial
services firms. This reform allows businesses to expand upon their existing
retirement programs and enables small operations to reach a new market segment.
In the U.S., State Street Bank and Trust is quietly positioning itself for
potential privatization, while Fidelity and Merrill Lynch are merely excited
about its prospect (Star). The establishment of private pension accounts results
in heightened competition between firms for market share of this segment.
Also, it brings a volume of business that financial institutions are unaccustomed
to. Businesses must increase capacity on the retail side and in back-office
operations, where transactions are processed. "A massive shift of wealth
from government into the private sector" (Roberts) has resulted in increased
global saving. This pattern offers global fund management companies, such
as U.S.-based Invesco, new opportunities and has boosted the degree of excitement
in the industry. The privatization trend allows financial services firms to
reach a broader spectrum of clientele and extend their expertise to individuals
with insufficient investment knowledge. Current workers and recent entrants
need to become more familiar with new pension strategies to serve their clients
more effectively in privatized social security markets.
The fund management business is globally integrated, where multinational financial
services firms are gaining from privatization around the world. For instance,
Invesco operates in twenty-five countries and has incurred tremendous growth
in the past four years due to this global trend (Roberts). The potential of
a given market depends on its commercial policy. The possibilities are vast
in a free-market atmosphere like Venezuela, where the financial system is
70% controlled by foreigners (Levine). Most countries recognize that "too
much red tape will result in lower returns to nations and their workers"
(Berlau). This pervasive behavior has led to rampant competition in the fund
management area of financial services. For example, workers in Britain can
choose from over 1,700 competing investment funds (Berlau). This satisfies
a variety of investment appetites, from risk averse to speculative. Vast choice
is a positive outcome of free-market capitalism.
Global social security privatization bestows a new responsibility upon the
financial services industry: helping people from all backgrounds plan for
later in life. In most industrialized nations, these firms are experienced
in retirement planning for people of varying economic backgrounds. In the
U.S., investors pumped $422.9 billion into mutual funds in 1997 (Moreau).
Privatization could generate an addition $160 billion each year in investment
capital for mutual funds, plus fees and commissions (Moreau). The pension
system in the U.S. is already diverse enough to accommodate the flurry of
new investors that would result from social security privatization. However,
companies would probably create new retirement funds to appeal to this new
investor segment. For example, many firms marketed technology-based mutual
funds during the "tech frenzy" of the late 1990's to reach innovative
and speculative investors.
While the financial services industry is equipped to respond to pension reform,
they are not strategically prepared. Experts recognize the importance of "educating
employees about long-term strategies" (Roberts). This perspective realignment
is critical in the U.S., where there is constant focus on short-term goals.
However, the need for long-term planning is less dire in environments where
the elderly are cared for by their descendents until death, such as in Asia.
In either case, financial representatives need to be reeducated to respond
to cultural differences. Industry pioneers, such as State Street Bank and
Trust and Invesco, are already changing the way the their employees think.
Industrialized nations are positioned best for privatization because they
have the most developed capital markets. In developing nations, the transition
to a system of private accounts is more complex. Most developing countries
do not have the framework in place that already exists in the U.S., Japan,
and some of Europe. This creates a large demand for the expertise of global
financial services firms in less-developed nations where reform is underway.
Workers are increasingly afforded the opportunity to travel abroad on international
consultation assignments, as well as more permanent arrangements. This creates
a stimulating and challenging environment for international financiers. Some
of the difficulties arise in cultural differences, from language to traditions.
Many American universities recognize the need for cultural proficiency today
and are emphasizing it in their programs.
Countries with privatized social security often host a complex web of regulations
to protect individuals. The global financier must be diligent in learning
foreign market restrictions to operate in a given environment and reap its
full potential. Pension regulations vary among countries and dictate the conduct
of international companies. In its early years of reform, Chile limited private
accounts to investing in domestic stocks and bonds, with the objective of
first developing the local economy (Carter and Shipman). In Britain, workers
are restricted from risky investments, such as futures and options (Berlau).
Singapore requires workers to put 40 percent of pension contributions into
a government-managed fund (Berlau). These are just a few examples of limitations
on investing in countries with private accounts, which global financiers must
become familiar with.
Employment opportunities in financial services have grown significantly, along
with the volume of applicants for these openings. As an upcoming college graduate,
the writer of this paper can identify with the difficulty in finding work
in this industry. Competition is fierce and companies are receiving countless
numbers of resumes. In response to a recent job inquiry by this author with
the Vanguard Group, the company remitted a correspondence stating that they
are unable to personally contact every applicant because of the volume of
resumes received (Vanguard). The Vanguard Group is a global fund company and
beneficiary of social security privatization. The challenges that applicants
face in entering the industry force them to hone their skills and try to stand
out among their peers. This large supply of workers puts pressure on current
financial services employees to perform exceptionally because they can quickly
be replaced. A giant labor supply and competitiveness result in superior customer
service for clients.
In 1980, Chile faced the same social security dilemma that many countries
are confronting today. A privatized system was implemented the following year
under authoritarian leader Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet ruled Chile from 1973
to 1990, a period marked by the "savage suppression of political dissidents"
("A Strongman's"). Privatization thrived to the extent that it contributed
to his demise and the return of democracy in 1990. Privatization brought real
economic growth to Chile, empowered individuals from all echelons of society,
and turned "every worker into a shareholder" (Pinera). Privatization
and prosperity in Chile have attracted attention from the global financial
services industry. Recently, prospects in Chile have increased due to declining
barriers against foreign firms. As a result of its success, the Chilean model
for social security reform is an example for other countries to follow.
The Chilean pension system is designed to provide maximum benefits for all
participants. Participation is not mandatory, except for new workforce entrants.
Individuals who partake contribute between 10 and 30% of earnings to private
accounts (Poortvliet and Laine, part II). 10% of earnings is equivalent to
the former payroll tax. Contributions are handled by any one of several fund
managers, known as Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, or AFPs. When private
accounts generate abnormal annual returns, the excess is placed in a reserve
to mitigate future downturns, acting as a safety net (Steelman). At retirement,
workers can choose to purchase an annuity or create a schedule for periodic
withdrawals from the account (Wiatrowski). In either case, surviving dependents
receive any remaining balances. Additionally, workers give a small percentage
of their salary to the AFP for disability and survivor insurance. The combination
of insurance and pension benefits offers Chileans peace-of-mind that was unavailable
before privatization.
The success of privatization in Chile is evidenced in several economic indicators
and other data. First, a staggering 90% of workers maintain their own private
accounts (Berlau). This figure should soon approach full participation since
private accounts are mandatory for new workforce entrants. Also, the domestic
savings rate has grown to about 25% of the gross domestic product (Garcia).
In comparison, the U.S. savings rate is a meager 4-5% (Littmann). Level of
savings is a reflection of reinvestment in the economy, which promotes growth.
In addition, Chileans have enjoyed 12% average annual returns on their retirement
savings (Littmann). Chile's annual yield soared as high as 29% in 1996 (Steelman).
The advantage to a privatized system is that workers can achieve higher returns
during the most prosperous times, despite vulnerability to economic downturns.
This gives workers a real stake in the health of the economy. However, in
the U.S. during the roaring 1990's, social security returns averaged just
3.9% (Dotsey). This figure fluctuates usually on the basis of inflation. Finally,
privatizing is responsible for boosting "real gross domestic product
growth rates to 7% from 3% annually" (Littmann). This truly shows the
positive effects of privatization on the Chilean economy.
The Chilean government strictly regulates the investment activity of AFPs
and limits most investments to the small supply of domestic vehicles. Therefore,
the products of all twenty AFPs are similar. Workers may switch from one AFP
to another at their own discretion. AFPs compete by offering promotional goods,
such as toasters, bicycles, and stereos, to people for switching their accounts
(Steelman). Individuals are limited to choosing from fewer than 400 publicly
traded companies, government notes, and can place just 12% of their holdings
in foreign instruments (Krebsbach). Isolationist behavior in the financial
services sector has been characteristic of Chile since they implemented social
security reform. Chile's development strategy for this industry parallels
Prebish and Cordozo's dependency theory, which advocates government intervention
to help local industries evolve by protecting them from foreign competition
(Kelleher and Klein 88). Chile is discovering the flaws in this theory because
greater investment abroad would draw greater attention to Chile and lead to
higher capital inflows. Recently, Chilean pension returns have declined because
of tight pension controls and the slowing of the global economy. Chile is
now recognizing the need to liberalize the financial services sector and has
introduced more relaxed laws to allow AFPs to increase their foreign market
leverage (Steelman).
Reduced regulation on overseas financial services firms has increased their
access to Chile's pension market. This new outward orientation allows Chileans
to tap vast opportunities abroad. Few firms have actually set up offices in
Chile; rather, they have found it more convenient to enter the market via
local representatives, consultants, and brokers who can introduce foreign
funds to the AFPs (Ciampi). International fund companies undergo a screening
process before they are extended distribution rights in Chile. A foreign fund
must obtain sponsorship from a Chilean AFP that can vouch for the fund's credibility,
size, diversity, and safety before the Comisin Clasificadora de Riesgo (Ciampi).
This procedure is consistent with Latin American business practices. Relationship
building often precedes business engagements. Establishing trust and developing
a rapport are necessary primers in Latin America. Time-conscious societies,
like the U.S., are devoid of such customs. Foreign fund representatives from
even the largest firms must oblige this practice to obtain a toehold in Chile's
lucrative pension market.
New accessibility to the Chilean pension market has fueled heightened competition
between domestic and international financial services groups. There are several
positive by-products of heavy competition. First, firms become more innovative
and diversify their array of products to fight for market share. For example,
some organizations are promoting American depository receipts, or ADRs (Ciampi).
An ADR is a certificate representing ownership in a bundle of foreign stocks.
ADRs are riskier and require more independent research. This product is costlier
and designed to attract polished, risk-seeking investors. ADRs extend wealthier
Chileans the opportunity for greater pension growth than mutual funds offer.
In addition, heavier "competition among international players has paved
the way for pricing wars that has led to drops in management fees of the offshore
funds" (Ciampi). Consumers are now enjoying lower fees because the sheer
volume of funds available limits the percentages that AFPs can charge clients.
Finally, congestion in an industry is typically a precursor for merger and
acquisition activity. Solomon Smith Barney, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and
J.P. Morgan Chase are just three examples from the U.S. financial services
industry. Consolidation has not begun to take place in this sector in Chile,
but the number of competitors in the market will lead to industry-wide changes.
Merger and acquisition activity will enable firms to realize synergy effects
and offset the effects of dropping management fees.
Investors must be cautious in a country where pension control has been shifted
from government to the private sector. Each day, Chilean investors forward
large sums of pension contributions to AFPs and move retirement accounts between
fund companies. This capital is exposed to transfer error and theft. In Chile,
employers have failed to deposit more than $250 million of workers' pay in
retirement accounts ("Will the Foundations"). In Britain, $450 million
was allegedly stolen from pension funds held by the late Robert Maxwell (Poortvliet
and Laine, part II). These instances demonstrate the vulnerability of private
accounts to error and crime. This should not discourage individuals from participating
in privatization, but encourage them to closely monitor their holdings to
avoid pension losses due to such behavior. Greed becomes a factor in any system
where billions of dollars are involved. Closer monitoring is needed to protect
individuals and their retirement accounts.
Today, financial services firms in Chile are competing for a portion of $35
billion in pension assets ("Will the Foundations"). Approximately
5.2 million workers hold these assets, which is the portion of Chile's workforce
that opted for private accounts ("Chile"). The Chilean Securities
and Insurance Superintendent has criticized some AFPs for pursuing this small
population with such aggressive publicity campaigns ("Managers Pursue").
Companies are now turning to a more discrete and highly effective venue to
reach individuals, the Internet. This offers investors anonymity and the ability
to closely monitor their accounts. The Internet has become a portal for Chileans
to an abundance of offshore funds ("Managers Pursue"). This trend
is likely to gain momentum because of its positive attributes and the education
level in Chile. Higher education programs were boosted during the Pinochet
years, where enrollments rose during his reign and thereafter ("Chile:
Education"). Also, financial support from the private pension program
has enabled Chile to improve its educational system (Pinera). Literacy rates
have now peaked at 95% ("Chile"). This is evidence that in addition
to an economic revolution in Chile, a social revolution is taking place too.
Global social security systems have become problematic in recent times. Changing
demographics are taking their toll on social security programs. Since these
changes are unavoidable, the need for reform is widespread. Britain, Chile,
and Australia are just a few of the countries that have already implemented
new pension systems. A privatized format is the best reform measure because
it enables individuals to increase their retirement income, while investing
money in their economy and promoting growth. Governments currently debating
how they will reform their failing social security systems are likely to adopt
privatization because it is a permanent resolution. When Margaret Thatcher
implemented a system of private accounts in Britain ten years ago, she faced
strong opposition from Labor Prime Minister Tony Blair. Today, social security
privatization has bipartisan support in Britain due to its success (Berlau).
Privatization is now spreading rapidly and should become one of the most visible
global trends of this century.
Chile was the first country to implement a privatized social security system.
The success of the Chilean system has made it a model for the world to follow.
Privatization in Chile has decreased the level of poverty, boosted private
savings, and stimulated economic growth. Also, turning people from all economic
backgrounds into shareholders has empowered the Chilean people. The lucrative
pension market in Chile has attracted many financial services firms from abroad.
Recently, reduced government controls have increased prospects for foreign
firms in Chile. Competition there has heightened and now consumers are paying
lower management fees. The Chilean model is applicable to industrialized and
developing nations alike. Chile has proven that a country with undeveloped
capital markets can institute a system of private accounts and achieve success.
Social security reform is even easier for developed economies that already
have the framework for a privatized system in place.
Privatized pension programs, like in Chile, create tremendous opportunities
for global financial services firms. Individuals need these firms to help
them establish private pension accounts and identify strong investment vehicles.
Many workers are still uncomfortable with privatization because they question
the dependability of the capital markets. However, they will see, as many
social security systems begin to approach insolvency, that there is more cause
for concern of state failure than market failure (Poortvliet and Laine, part
II). The global workforce will soon welcome privatized pension systems because
of the true potential to retire with greater wealth, as demonstrated by Chile
and Britain. They will turn to financial services firms to help them achieve
their goals. This increased demand for financial services has generated a
lot of enthusiasm among companies and will push employment in the industry
to new levels.
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