"Abortion:
Law, Public Services and Decision"
by Russ Kleinbach
In SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES,
Volume 7, Summer 1983, number 2
There
should be a distinction between (a) proscriptive law, (b) public service
programs, and Q personal ethical decisions. With reference to proscriptive law
and public services, society should collectively guarantee the rights (and their
actualization) of each of us. With reference to personal ethics, we should
fulfill our individual obligations to the rest of us. Collectively we ought to
provide pregnancy prevention information and materials, abortions, and services
for desired term pregnancies.
This
paper is primarily concerned with a social policy on the question of abortion
and only secondarily with personal ethics. Therefore, I will begin with a
discussion of proscriptive law and public services. I am here thinking of law in
its proscriptive or prohibiting function, and of public services in the popular
meaning of public taxation for the provision of public services for all who wish
to use them, e.g., public school, public libraries, public health clinics and
hospitals. After discussing the law and public services, I will address what for
me is the most difficult aspect, i.e., the personal decision of whether and when
to have an abortion.
The
position I am taking includes the following statements:
1.
There should be a clear distinction between: (a) proscriptive or prohibiting law,
of which there should be as little as possible concerning "personal"
decisions; (b) helpful public service programs, of which there should be
as many as are necessary; and (c) personal ethical decisions, which
should be based on obligations to self and others, and not on self-rights. With
reference to proscriptive law and public services, we should collectively
attempt to guarantee the rights of each of us. With reference to personal
ethics we should attempt to know and fulfill our individual obligations
to the rest of US.
2. Collectively we as members of a society ought to do what we can through (a)
education, (b) pregnancy planning and birth control, and (c) the establishment
of financial, counseling and adoptive support systems to reduce the number of
unwanted pregnancies and give full support to those women
3. Abortion is a non-preferred medical procedure and, for the well-being of
everyone involved, should be done as infrequently as possible.
4. The 1973 Supreme Court Decision on abortion is essentially a good
decision.
5. Welfare and all medical insurance and disability policies should cover fully
both normal pregnancies and elective abortions, and of course complications
connected with each.
I
am addressing the question of Law and Public Services in the light of the
following criteria. I believe that these criteria are (a) reasonable and
logical, (b) consistent with an emerging world wide consensus of human
experience and testimony, (c) consistent with available empirical evidence. The
criteria:
1. We are co-persons, social in nature and responsible for each other's
well-being.
2. A society is healthy and civilized to the degree that its laws and structures
enable, encourage and facilitate its citizens in making healthy decisions and in
acting creatively. A society is repressive and uncivilized to the degree that
its laws and structures proscribe personal behavior and inhibit creative
action.
3. Every individual should have a right of access to what is necessary for the
self-actualization of his/her human potential. This right of access does not
include the body or bodily processes of another individual.
4. Every individual should have the right of effective participation in his/her
life decisions.
5. The
principles of justice should be universal, there should be reciprocity and
equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of human beings as
individual persons.
To
gain a perspective on the desired role of law with respect to abortion, I would,
as others have done, like to draw a parallel between pregnancy and the donation
of body parts for transplant to save another's life, or the use of one's body to
maintain another person's life.1
The example in our recent past is the case of Robert McFall (who died of
aplastic anemia) and his cousin, David Shimp.
The Story: Robert McFall developed aplastic anemia, a
usually fatal disease in which the bone marrow does not produce enough blood
cells and platelets. Doctors recommended a bone marrow transplant. The one
person who qualified as donor (McFall's cousin) refused to make the donation.
McFall asked the courts to order his cousin to give the donation. The courts
refused.
Judge John P. Fleherty said that even though Shimp's
decision was "morally indefensible," to force the operation on an
unwilling person would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and that to
"require forcible submission to a medical procedure and to forcibly extract
bodily tissues causes revulsion to the judicial mind."2
I agree with the judge, that the decision to use
one's body or parts of one's body to host or maintain another should be a
legally free choice of the potential host. Through law we may tax our property,
through education we may encourage sharing of our bodies, but we ought not to
force the donation of an individual's body. Such law would violate the most
elemental aspects of individual integrity and democracy.
In the case of giving parts or all of your body to
maintain another person, the decision can be made (and often must be made)
before the giving begins. And if this is a long term giving, for example, the
giving of a series of blood donations or skin grafts, the donor might
conceivably stop giving midway through the program because of mental or physical
complications, unless, of course, one were under contract prior to the beginning
of the process.
Abortion can be looked upon as the withdrawal of
bodily life support on the part of the mother. In the case of planned
pregnancies the situation is parallel to the giving of parts of one's body, over
a period of time, for maintaining another person, and the same variables apply
to the possibilities for stopping the process. However, the parallel changes
when we consider the unplanned pregnancy because the maintenance process has
begun without intentional decision. And while the decision to abort a planned
pregnancy may at times be considered a breach of an assumed responsibility, the
situation is very different in the case of the unplanned pregnancy. Ceasing
bodily support of a fetus or anyone else cannot be looked at as a breach of duty
except where such a duty has been assumed in the first place. In this case,
the first moment of real decision is when there is an actual pregnancy about
which to decide.
The vast majority of abortions are performed for
girls and women who did not plan their pregnancies, and because of age,
finances, marital status or career do not desire a child at that time. The few
women who plan their pregnancies and then desire an abortion probably do so
because of complications in the pregnancy or in their personal or social life
which develop after the beginning of the pregnancy.
However,
even though the moral questions and the variables to be considered are different
between the planned and unplanned pregnancy, I believe the decision in both
cases should be free of legal restraints at least to the degree established by
the 1973 Court decision. My position on transplants and both types of abortion
is still that no one, before or after birth, child or adult, should have the
legal right to be dependent upon the bodily processes of another against that
person's will. A right to life and the right of access to what is necessary for
self-actualization should not guarantee having either a legal right to be given
the use of, or a legal right to be allowed the continued use of another person's
body, even if one needs it for life itself.
While I have spoken of law in terms of the
prohibition of abortion, I see social service programs (which are also
established by law) in terms of their helping function. Community services for
individuals in need are developing in western liberal capitalist societies as
the means for guaranteeing every individual in society at least minimal access
to those goods and services necessary for his/her human development and for
living a reasonably comfortable life.
Public services as a concept and policy accepts
social stratification, but also accepts the liberal position that, among other
things, to be human requires that a person effectively participate in decisions
concerning his/her life. To effectively participate in decisions requires at
least (a) absence of legal restraints, (b) access to all relevant information,
and (c) access to material resources necessary to actualize the decisions.
Without the material resources one can have only the idea of decisions
and not actual decisions.
Access to necessary material resources as a right has
been explicitly denied by the U.S. Legislature and U.S. Supreme Court in the
Hyde Amendment and the Maher (1977) and McRae (1980) decisions. What these
decisions in effect say is that (a) although government may not place obstacles
in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those not of its own creation, i.e., poverty and (b) the constitution does not
confer entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the
advantages of the freedom of choice.3
With reference to abortions, what the community is or
should be doing is providing all women access to the material resources and
services necessary to actualize a life decision. As in all other cases of public
services, some members or groups may disagree for various reasons with the
decisions of users. However, of overriding importance is the democratic
principle that each citizen be able to effectively participate in his/her life
decisions. This is particularly true in issues involving one's body and self.
In this context I believe that public services should
be concerned with the prevention of unwanted pregnancies, and provide all people
of puberty age with full information on pregnancy prevention. I also believe we
should guarantee a pregnant woman full free optimal pre-natal and delivery care,
and adoption placement if she wishes to deliver and put the child up for
adoption, or full free optimal counseling and abortion services if she
wishes to have an abortion. ,
If
there are no restrictions on elective abortions beyond those of the 1973 Supreme
Court decision, and if social and health care programs provide all citizens with
(a) a thorough education on and easily available pregnancy prevention material
and devices, and, (b) a full range of counseling and financial support systems
for both those women who seek abortions and those who wish to carry their babies
to term, then there will be many fewer abortion decisions to be made and
those that are made will be much less restricted by legal and financial
considerations, and thus more open to social and ethical considerations.
The discussion thus far has dealt with social
responsibilities of the rest of us toward those people making personal decisions
regarding the having or performing of abortions. Let us now turn to the problem
facing a person making the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, and
by extension the problem facing those who are close to a woman facing this
decision.
I know of no better or healthier criteria than Paul
Tillich's understanding of "love" and of "'justice."4
I understand Tillich to mean that to do the "loving" thing would be to
do that which brings about the most fulfilling relationship between (a) self and
Self, (b) self and others, and (c) self and the rest of nature/world/God. And to
do the "just" thing is to do that which brings about the
"fulfillment" of individuals "within the unity of universal
fulfillment."5
This perspective differs from one which focuses on one's rights, and
instead focuses on an obligation to the fulfillment of self and others,
and the care and nurturing of relationships.
Using these criteria, an individual ought, in my
opinion, to do that which is most supportive and creative with reference
to:
(a) One's relationship to the people around one, with whom one lives, works and
plays. This usually means one's spouse, relatives (including present and future
children), friends and colleagues. The overall relationship to one's
children may be enhanced by an abortion, if for example, one is 16 years old and
not yet ready to have a child, or one is 32 years old with 6 children, and at
the limits of one's physical, emotional and financial parenting capacities. The
important point here is to evaluate a particular decision in terms of one's life
long involvement in all relevant relationships. Parenthetically, from what I
know of the situation, it is this criterion which should have obligated the
cousin to give the bone marrow transplant to Robert McFall.
(b) One's relationship to the larger society and the rest of nature. It is at
this point that questions of population growth rates, and the social costs of
unwanted children must be addressed. It is also the point where one is aware of
the desires of non-fertile parents who wish to adopt, and the effect of
abortions on those who perform them.
(c) One's own mental, emotional and physical well-being. It is at this point
that one weighs such things as one's physical and emotional maturity, one's
parental readiness, and one's educational and career development.
(d) The maximal fulfillment of all members of the society. If we as individuals
are to make particular decisions with reference to abortion, in a patterned way
to further this universal fulfillment, we will have to make the particular
decisions so that persons become parents when they are ready and desire to
become parents. This will mean
that particular potential people will never be born.
However, over generations of time people will be born and develop, and if
the patterns of conception and parenting are planned and desired by parents, the
overall fulfillment level of the general population will rise.
It
is hard and somewhat tragic when these criteria are brought to bear and a
decision is made to abort a particular fetus. And there are clearly times when
this sense of tragedy should outweigh other considerations, such as personal
feelings, convenience and financial cost. But these decisions should be made by
the persons involved and as free as possible from legal and financial
restraints.
We should also remember that we cannot avoid making
these hard decisions about the beginning, quality and ending of life. Right now
we are continually deciding who shall live and how well, or who shall die and
how rapidly. We do this in wars, in courts, in school systems and in hospitals.
We make decisions about abortion, IUDs, birth control pills, the rhythm method,
and sterilization. We cannot avoid these hard decisions and therefore we should
make them in the light of criteria which provide for the maximum democracy and
human fulfillment for everyone.
In 1969 a couple I know well, living in Vietnam,
selected and adopted two orphans from among the abandoned children in Saigon.
They chose relatively healthy ones, because 50% of the children from which they
were choosing would die before the age of five anyway. They reasoned that since
so many would die anyway it was better to save two of the healthier ones for
survival. In the same manner as individuals/couples are choosing to have only
two children rather than "however many God chooses to send them,"
these families are preventing the births of countless individuals, and they are
choosing the optimal time in their own lives to become parents. I believe this
pattern of planning is necessary for the maximal fulfillment of all members of
the society and I believe that abortion as an option is necessary for
that planning to be carried out to its fullest.
Footnotes

1
See for example Judith Jarvis Thompson, "A Defense of Abortion,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. I, No. 1 (1971), 47-66. Princeton
University Press.
2 For one account see Science, Vol. 201, 18 August 1978, p. 596.
3 Law Week, Vol. 480, June 24, 1980, pp. 4941-4957. The Hyde
Amendment (1976) severely limits the use of any federal funds to reimburse
the cost of abortion under the Medicaid program. The Maher decision held as
constitutional a Connecticut welfare regulation under which Medicaid
recipients received payments for medical services incident to childbirth but
not for medical services to non-therapeutic abortions. The McRae decision
upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment.
4 Paul Tillich,
Love, Power and justice, New York, Oxford University Press, 1960.
5 Ibid., p. 65